Québec Droite

Un des meilleurs articles qui expliquent le pourquoi de l'agressivité spéculative de la CDP.

Le gouvernement a emprunté 36 milliards pour le FARR environ à 5 %, les fonds actuariels sont basés sur un rendement de 7 %.

Mais dans les faits réels, les fonds n'ont généré qu'un rendement de 3 % dans la décennie, une des raisons principales c'est que les états souverains pour stimuler leurs économies on constamment diminué leurs taux d'intérêt (l'origine de la crise économique) à tel point que les obligations d'états ne rapportent que 2 à 3 %.

Donc pour tenter de récupérer la mise du gouvernement, la CDP a été obligée de faire de la spéculation à haute voltige, on connaît les résultats.

C’est le seul journalisme, qui a assez de cran pour parler du vrai problème, les promesses des politiciens de donner des retraites dorées basées sur un régime à prestation déterminée sont plutôt un suicide financier et irréalisable dans la conjoncture économique actuelle.

Nous savons tous que la CDP a perdu plus de 40 milliards, serait-ce que la pression pour obtenir un haut de rendement est directement liée à des promesses que l’état a accordées a ses prestataires, sans avoir les capacités financières pour les satisfaire ?

Voici un extrait d’un article du National Post, après les déboires de la CDP, il est regrettable qu’aucun journaliste Québécois, n’ait jamais soumis la problématique sous cette perspective.

The model that's killing pension plans Terence Corcoran, Financial Post Published: Friday, February 27, 2009 Those issues are, in no special order:

1. Why does the Caisse exist in the first place?
2. Why are pension managers risking taxpayer money on volatile equity markets and even more problematic investments?
3. How long will average voters put up with public pension operations that nationalize savings and, in many cases, reward a few and pass the risk on to taxpayers when things go wrong--as they will?

 

As the Financial Post's Karen Mazurkewich reports today, these and other public pension managers could report cumulative losses totalling $100-billion for the year.

 

They will all blame bad markets and the global financial crisis. None will look at the possibility that they are operating under faulty investment models and wonky actuarial theories.

 

In the view of many economists who study pension funds, these plans are time bombs of risk whose losses taxpayers will inevitably have to pay for.

 

But first, the question is why do these giant public pension plans exist?

 

They are, essentially, wealth confiscated by governments. The CPPIB and parts of the Quebec Caisse invest funds to provide basic pensions for all citizens, using money taxed from all their constituents. The rest of the public pension investment activity is on behalf of unionized monopoly government service providers --hydro workers, police, municipal employees, teachers.

 

All are set to receive relatively lavish pensions paid for by Canadian taxpayers who have no comparable pension plans.

 

That gap is serious enough. But when it turns out that taxpayers will have to bail out the lavish union pension plans, or that their government pensions will require higher and higher cross-generational premiums, the morality of the gap widens even further At the heart of the pension meltdown is the investment model.

 

The investment managers who led the Caisse into its 2008 meltdown were simply following the dominant investment theories of our time: Equity markets theoretically will provide solid average returns over the long term.

 

As we've noted in this space many times over the last few years, in the view of financial economists the first part of the model -- that equities provide guaranteed returns over the long term -- is untenable