Québec Droite

Comme nos politiciens ne parlent jamais des vraies choses et nos médias ont tendance à oublier ce sujet fort épineux, car ils sont sur-syndiqués, voici la réalité des fonds de retraite au Canada.

Dans le monde entier, on est en train de renégocier ces avantages impossibles à soutenir financièrement, aussi bien dans le secteur privé ou les États souverains.

DB :     Les régimes à prestations déterminées se retrouvent principalement chez les gouvernements et dans les grandes entreprises, le montant est déterminé à l'avance, pour le restant de la vie de l'employé, dès qu'il prend sa retraite.

L'employeur est responsable de la solvabilité du régime, c'est-à-dire du niveau de capitalisation nécessaire pour assumer les obligations actuelles et futures de la caisse de retraite. Si ce niveau n'est pas suffisant, la caisse est alors en « déficit actuariel », l'employeur doit donc renflouer la caisse.

DC :    Les régimes à cotisations déterminées versent eux aussi une rente au travailleur retraité, généralement jusqu'à son décès ou à celui de son conjoint survivant.  

La différence avec les régimes à prestations déterminées, c'est que le montant de la rente est calculé selon le rendement de la caisse de retraite. Il n'est donc pas fixé à l'avance. Et l'employeur n'a aucune obligation de renflouer la caisse en cas de déficit actuariel. Les travailleurs ne peuvent donc pas déterminer à l'avance avec certitude leur train de vie à la retraite en se basant uniquement sur la rente de leur caisse de retraite.

Extrait de: Gauging the Path of Private Canadian Pensions

2010 Update on the State of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension Plans

By the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada

Points saillants du rapport :

Pension plan défis l'approfondissement et l'intensification des déficits de financement

·         La capacité des Canadiens à maintenir un mode de vie sain et financièrement confortable après sa retraite est devenue un des défis de plus troublant de la nation.

·         Les déficits de financement des fonds de retraite ont grimpé de 160 milliards de dollars en 2003 à environ 350 milliards de dollars en 2008.

·         La position globale de financement des plans DB s'est considérablement détériorée depuis le 31 décembre 2004, avec la grande majorité (92 %) des régimes de retraite privés dans une position de déficit au 31 décembre 2008.

·         Selon les estimations effectuées par Mercer, de 71 % des Canadiens les plans de retraite à prestations déterminés étaient dans une position de déficit de solvabilité à la fin de 2007. À la fin de 2008, cette statistique avait augmenté à 92 %.

·         À la fin de 2008, près de 40 % des régimes à prestations déterminées eu les ratios de solvabilité moins 70 %, et plus 70 % des régimes à prestations déterminées avait les ratios de solvabilité inférieure à 77 % (sans indexation) et 57 % avec indexation.

Crise financière met en évidence la nécessité d'une réforme fondamentale

·         La récente crise financière accompagnée d'une chaîne de faillites de haute-profil  a mis en évidence la nécessité de réformes plus larges, plus profondes et fondamentaux de la Loi sur les pensions et de l'autre côté des plans de retraite à prestations déterminées – le risque que l'employeur ne parvient pas à s'acquitter de ses obligations de retraite tel que Nortel.

·         Régime de retraite typique perdu 20 % de sa valeur, mesurée sur une base de la valeur de marché pendant les six mois à partir de septembre 2008 à février 2009.

·         Il n'est tout simplement pas possible sous les règles fiscales actuelles pour générer ou pour imiter les avantages qui sont donnés par les régimes de retraite publics DB, asymétrie fiscale.

·         Sur 12 millions de travailleurs dans le secteur privé, plus de 9 millions (2006) n’ont aucune couverture de retraite par leur employeur, les études démontrent presque que la moitié des travailleurs dans le privé risque d’être sur le seuil de pauvreté.

·         Le système actuel de retraite au Canada a produit des fonds de pension pour les :  "nantis" et "démunis" – à une extrémité du spectre sont salariés du secteur public qui aiment la sécurité du gouvernement-garanti des régimes de retraite DB (garantie par le peuple du secteur privé) et à l'autre extrémité du spectre ( 9 millions de travailleurs du secteur privé n’ont aucune système de retraite fournis par leurs employeurs ), plus du ¾ des travailleurs du secteur privé n’ont aucune garantie de revenus ou de retraite fournis par leurs employeurs.

·         Concevoir un système de retraite qui est durable à long terme, juste pour les générations présentes et futures, simples à administrer et rentables.

·         Régimes de retraite doivent être autonomes et durable. Ils ne devraient pas fonctionner de manière qui emprunte indûment les générations futures à payer la présente affaire.

·         Régimes de retraite ne devraient pas avoir à métamorphose dans les empires de la dette. (Déficit actuariel sens large (Québec) : 124 Milliards, déficit actuariel fédéral : 522 milliards).  

Foreword

Consistent with earlier findings, the issue of under-funded pension plans has become one of the most perplexing financial issues facing business executives, legislators and Canadian pensioners who are or will in the future be reliant on pension income as an important component of their overall retirement incomes.

Importantly, we would continue to support an approach that corrects fundamental or structural imperfections and systemic influences.

While there are a variety of public examples of what happens when pension regimes become dysfunctional for workers, recent Canadian experiences with the likes of Nortel Networks, AbitibiBowater, Fraser Papers, and CanWest underscore that pension plan default can occur within companies of any magnitude. More so, these events highlight a need to better preserve pension plan solvency and member protection, p7.

Introduction

What is most apparent is that the magnitude of the pension plan challenge has amplified. Funding deficits have intensified with funding ratios (defined as the ratio of market value of plan assets to actuarial value of plan liabilities) eroding to unsustainable levels. Moreover, we have witnessed a disturbing trajectory where an estimated $160 billion required to fully fund deficit DB pension plans at 2003 year end grew to $190 billion by the end of 2004 and has expectedly revealed itself to be much worse at the end of 2008 by exceeding $350 billion, p9.

The post retirement expectations and needs of the "boomer" generation, a group that will live longer than previous generations, will place enormous demands on the country's health and social support systems. The ability of Canadians to maintain a financially comfortable and healthy lifestyle after retirement has become one of this country's most vexing challenges. For many Canadians, post-retirement health and well-being are increasingly and inextricably tied to Canada's pension system.

Unfortunately, and the evidence is compelling, the pension system in this country has deteriorated significantly. There are problems related

1.       to under-funding,

2.       to allegations of archaic accounting practices and

3.       to sentiment of redundant legislation and public policy.

An abundance of literature that confirms the predicted risks of Canada's fledgling pension system and the proposed actions for transformation can be consulted.

At minimum, however, we need to accept that in order to address the challenges before us we must realize that the pension system is gravely imperfect and that there are options at our disposal. Only then can focus be directed on creating a sustainable pension 'system' that is financially viable, equitable, and appropriately aligned with the retirement needs of all Canadians, p10.

Executive Summary

During the six month period from September 2008 to February 2009, the typical DB pension plan lost approximately 20% of its assets value, measured on a market value basis. According to estimates performed by MERCER, 71% of Canadian defined benefit pension plans were in a solvency deficit position at the end of 2007. By the end of 2008, that statistic had risen to 92%. At the end of 2008, almost 40% of defined benefit plans had solvency ratios under 70%, and over 70% of defined benefit plans had solvency ratios under 80%, p11.

Universal Coverage

The present pension system in Canada has produced pension "haves" and "have-nots". At one end of the spectrum are public sector employees who enjoy the security of government-guaranteed DB pension plans and on the other end of the spectrum are some private sector employees having noincome or retirement security whatsoever. This asymmetrical coverage of working Canadians can be rectified by making enrolment in workplace pension plans mandatory for all employees while also re-pricing public sector pension plans p52.

Taxation

CGA-Canada proposes uniform tax treatment of all pension plan transactions, including funding and payout irrespective of their origin and structure, so that these transactions are not driven by tax consideration but rational economic considerations. A commentary published by CD. Howe Institute reasonably contends that "Canada's private retirement saving system serves some workers well and others not so well, depending on whether they have a career in the public sector or in the private sector."

Previously discussed, many Canadian workers in the private sector have no employer-sponsored pension arrangements, while those that do can generally expect plan constructs or plan benefits to pale in comparison.

The study further highlights that " The unfairness of Canada's private retirement saving system, which rests on rules that limit annual contributions to retirement savings vehicles; unnecessarily tie pension saving to employment and employment income; restrict the kinds of income that can be used for retirement saving; and inhibit creation of the kind of large, pooled pension arrangements in the private sector that work well for public sector workers."
CGA-Canada supports the author's commentary and would reiterate the importance of eliminating or relaxing the rules that limit an individual's, p53.

Guiding Principles

In addition to the framework outlined above for pension reforms, guiding principles should be incorporated in any comprehensive reform of the retirement system. These principles aim at guarding against the disintegration of the system in the face of man-made follies and uncontrollable external shocks. The reference to pension plans is meant to include CPP and RPP under the management of a private pension authority, p55.

1)    No participant in the pension industry should be allowed to grow too big to fail. Hence the proposed private pension authority for RPP should be independent of the CPP. When a participant in the pension industry grows too big to fail, it should be split into manageable entities.

2)    Whenever a pension industry participant needs to be bailed out, it should be nationalized and be subject to assumption by the government and not vice versa.

3)    Failed theories and enterprises should not be resurrected in new form or under alternate moniker.

4)    The compensation structure in the pension industry should not be asymmetrical. There should be no incentives without disincentives, no rewards without punishment and no nationalization of losses and privatization of gains.

5)    Simple is beautiful and there is no substitute for common sense. The pension industry should not be subjected to the passing fade of the day.

6)    The investment universe of pension plans should exclude the derivatives and similar highly risky instruments, which Warren Buffet famously referred to as "weapons of mass destruction".

7)    Pension plans should be self-sufficient and sustainable. They should not operate in a manner that unduly borrows from future generations to pay the present one.

8)    Pension plans should not be allowed to metamorphose into the empires of debt.

9)    Citizens should be encouraged to take charge of their own financial destiny and create a fourth pillar to support their retirement by way of private savings.

Conclusion

In a changed world, the Canadian retirement system requires a drastic makeover. Ad hoc arrangements will not solve the present pension crisis while accounting also for Canada's demographic profile. Canada requires comprehensive pension reforms to create a new pension blueprint for the new
normal world.

The required changes can be manifested only by combining regulatory changes and structural changes that do not unnecessarily mingle the existing three pillars. The third pillar of the system needs to be strengthened by affording greater protections or replacing unsustainable DB plans and inadequate DC plans with hybrid plans that draw upon the best elements of each. An appropriate set of guiding principles will ensure that the system remains robust and that it secures the futures of all Canadians, p55.

The Current State of Affairs: Defined Benefit Plans in Canada

Table 3 - Pension Plan Coverage by Sector

Source: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada Survey.

Table 6 - Pension Plan Membership % by Industry

Source: Statistics Canada. Pension Plans in Canada Survey.

Risk free

The risk free basis has been updated to reflect the market conditions as at December 31, 2008 and is presented as Appendix A, including also the comparative measures used at December 31, 2004, the last date at which results were released. The risk free basis intends to remove any discretion in the selection of going-concern assumptions of each plan, and it removes also the influence of the investment policies in the selection of such assumptions.

Accepter un rendement de 4 % qui est beaucoup plus réaliste et moins risqué,
et réduire les prestations, Q.D.

Overall funding position

The overall funding position has significantly deteriorated since December 31,2004 on both bases (with and without indexation), with the vast majority of pension plans in a deficit position as at December 31, 2008. The average funding ratio has decreased from 112% to 77% on the 'without indexation 'basis and from 71% to 57% on the 'with indexation' basis. The main factors leading to this deterioration can be attributed to:

Overall Funding Position of Canadian Pension Plans Results with no Indexation of Benefits

Overall Funding Position of Canadian Pension Plans Results with Indexation of Benefits