10 QE Questions by Nouriel Roubini

Deux articles intéressants sur le QE par Nouriel Roubini, il semble que la FED (second article) commence à se désintéresser du QE, il était temps, ç’a juste enrichi les riches et les pauvres sont juste devenus plus pauvres.


Extrait de : Ten QE Questions, Nouriel Roubini, Project Syndicate, Feb. 28, 2013

NEW YORK – Most observers regard unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing (QE) as necessary to jump-start growth in today’s anemic economies. But questions about the effectiveness and risks of QE have begun to multiply as well. In particular, ten potential costs associated with such policies merit attention.

1 - First, while a purely “Austrian” response (that is, austerity) to bursting asset and credit bubbles may lead to a depression, QE policies that postpone the necessary private- and public-sector deleveraging for too long may create an army of zombies: zombie financial institutions, zombie households and firms, and, in the end, zombie governments. So, somewhere between the Austrian and Keynesian extremes, QE needs to be phased out over time.

2 - Second, repeated QE may become ineffective over time as the channels of transmission to real economic activity become clogged.

1)      The bond channel doesn’t work when bond yields are already low;

2)      and the credit channel doesn’t work when banks hoard liquidity and velocity collapses.

Indeed,

Ø  those who can borrow (high-grade firms and prime households) don’t want or need to,

Ø  while those who need to – highly leveraged firms and non-prime households – can’t, owing to the credit crunch.

Ø  Moreover, the stock-market channel leading to asset reflation following QE works only in the short run if growth fails to recover. And the reduction in real interest rates via a rise in expected inflation when open-ended QE is implemented risks eventually stoking inflation expectations.

3 - Third, the foreign-exchange channel of QE transmission

Ø  the currency weakening implied by monetary easing

Ø  is ineffective if several major central banks pursue QE at the same time.

When that happens, QE becomes a zero-sum game, because not all currencies can fall, and not all trade balances can improve, simultaneously. The outcome, then, is “QE wars” as proxies for “currency wars.”

Exacte, c’est pour cela le QE du Royaume-Uni, du Japon, et des États-Unis ne servent à rien pour tenter de dévaluer leurs monnaies, tous les grands pays jouent le jeu en même temps, par contre, pour le Canada ça peut être néfaste dû à une sur-évaluation de sa monnaie, car notre seul voisin de proximité sont les Américains.

4 - Fourth, QE in advanced economies leads to excessive capital flows to emerging markets, which face a difficult policy challenge. Sterilized foreign-exchange intervention keeps domestic interest rates high and feeds the inflows. But unsterilized intervention and/or reducing domestic interest rates creates excessive liquidity that can feed domestic inflation and/or asset and credit bubbles.

At the same time, forgoing intervention and allowing the currency to appreciate erodes external competitiveness, leading to dangerous external deficits. Yet imposing capital controls on inflows is difficult and sometimes leaky. Macroprudential controls on credit growth are useful, but sometimes ineffective in stopping asset bubbles when low interest rates continue to underpin generous liquidity conditions.

5 - Fifth, persistent QE can lead to asset bubbles both where it is implemented and in countries where it spills over.

1)      Such bubbles can occur in equity markets, housing markets (Hong Kong, Singapore), commodity markets,

2)      bond markets (with talk of a bubble increasing in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan),

3)      and credit markets (where spreads in some emerging markets, and on high-yield and high-grade corporate debt, are narrowing excessively).

Although QE may be justified by weak economic and growth fundamentals, keeping rates too low for too long can eventually feed such bubbles. That is what happened in 2000-2006, when the US Federal Reserve aggressively cut the federal funds rate to 1% during the 2001 recession and subsequent weak recovery and then kept rates down, thus fueling credit/housing/subprime bubbles.

Exactement, ce qui s’est passé au Canada, des intérêts trop bas trop longtemps et une SCHL trop complaisante dictée par les politiciens ont permis de créer une bulle immobilière.

6 - Sixth, QE can create:

1.      Moral-hazard problems by weakening governments’ incentive to pursue needed economic reforms.

2.      It may also delay needed fiscal austerity if large deficits are monetized.

3.      And, by keeping rates too low, prevent the market from imposing discipline.

7 - Seventh, exiting QE is tricky.

Ø  If exit occurs too slowly and too late, inflation and/or asset/credit bubbles could result. Also, if exit occurs by selling the long-term assets purchased during QE, a sharp increase in interest rates might choke off recovery, resulting in large financial losses for holders of long-term bonds.

Ø  And, if the exit occurs via a rise in the interest rate on excess reserves (to sterilize the effect of a base-money overhang on credit growth), the ensuing losses for central banks’ balance sheets could be significant.

8 - Eighth, an extended period of negative real interest rates implies a redistribution of income and wealth from creditors and savers toward debtors and borrowers. Of all the forms of adjustment that can lead to deleveraging (growth, savings, orderly debt restructuring, or taxation of wealth), debt monetization (and eventually higher inflation) is the least democratic, and it seriously damages savers and creditors, including pensioners and pension funds.

9 - Ninth, QE and other unconventional monetary policies can have serious unintended consequences. Eventually, excessive inflation may erupt, or credit growth may slow, rather than accelerate, if banks – faced with very low net interest-rate margins – decide that risk relative to reward is insufficient.

10 - Finally, there is a risk of losing sight of any road back to conventional monetary policies. Indeed, some countries are ditching their inflation-targeting regime and moving into uncharted territory, where there may be no anchor for price expectations. The US has moved from QE1 to QE2 and now to QE3, which is potentially unlimited and linked to an unemployment target. Officials are now actively discussing the merit of negative policy rates. And policymakers have moved to a risky credit-easing policy as QE’s effectiveness has waned.

In short, policies are becoming more unconventional, not less, with little clarity about short-term effects, unintended consequences, and long-term impacts. To be sure, QE and other unconventional monetary policies do have important short-term benefits.

But if such policies remain in place for too long, their side effects
could be severe – and the longer-term costs very high.


Extrait de : The Trapdoors at the Fed’s Exit, Nouriel Roubini, EconoMonitor, April 29th,2013

The ongoing weakness of America’s economy – where deleveraging in the private and public sectors continues apace – has led to stubbornly high unemployment and sub-par growth. The effects of fiscal austerity – a sharp rise in taxes and a sharp fall in government spending since the beginning of the year – are undermining economic performance even more.

Indeed, recent data have effectively silenced hints by some Federal Reserve officials that the Fed should begin exiting from its current third (and indefinite) round of quantitative easing (QE3).

a.      Given slow growth,

b.      high unemployment (which has fallen only because discouraged workers are leaving the labor force),

c.       and inflation well below the Fed’s target, this is no time to start constraining liquidity.

The problem is that the Fed’s liquidity injections are not creating credit for the real economy, but rather boosting leverage and risk-taking in financial markets. The issuance of risky junk bonds under loose covenants and with excessively low interest rates is increasing; the stock market is reaching new highs, despite the growth slowdown; and money is flowing to high-yielding emerging markets.

Even the periphery of the eurozone is benefiting from the wall of liquidity unleashed by the Fed, the Bank of Japan, and other major central banks. With interest rates on government bonds in the US, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland at ridiculously low levels, investors are on a global quest for yield.

It may be too soon to say that many risky assets have reached bubble levels, and that leverage and risk-taking in financial markets is becoming excessive. But the reality is that credit and asset/equity bubbles are likely to form in the next two years, owing to loose US monetary policy. The Fed has signaled that QE3 will continue until the labor market has improved sufficiently (likely in early 2014), with the interest rate at 0% until unemployment has fallen at least to 6.5% (most likely no earlier than the beginning of 2015).

Even when the Fed starts to raise interest rates (some time in 2015), it will proceed slowly. In the previous tightening cycle, which began in 2004, it took the Fed two years to normalize the policy rate. This time, the unemployment rate and household and government debt are much higher. Rapid normalization – like that undertaken in the space of a year in 1994 – would crash asset markets and risk leading to a hard economic landing.

But if financial markets are already frothy now, consider how frothy they will be in 2015, when the Fed starts tightening, and in 2017 (if not later), when the Fed finishes tightening? Last time, interest rates were too low for too long (2001-2004), and the subsequent rate normalization was too slow, inflating huge bubbles in credit, housing, and equity markets.

We know how that movie ended, and we may be poised for a sequel. The weak real economy and job market, together with high debt ratios, suggest the need to exit monetary stimulus slowly. But a slow exit risks creating a credit and asset bubble as large as the previous one, if not larger.

Pursuing real economic stability, it seems,
may lead again to financial instability.

Some at the Fed – Chairman Ben Bernanke and Vice Chair Janet Yellen – argue that policymakers can pursue both goals: the Fed will raise interest rates slowly to provide economic stability (strong income and employment growth and low inflation) while preventing financial instability (credit and asset bubbles stemming from high liquidity and low interest rates) by using macro-prudential supervision and regulation of the financial system. In other words, the Fed will use regulatory instruments to control credit growth, risk-taking, and leverage.

But another Fed faction – led by Governors Jeremy Stein and Daniel Tarullo – argues that macro-prudential tools are untested, and that limiting leverage in one part of the financial market simply drives liquidity elsewhere.

Indeed, the Fed regulates only banks, so liquidity and leverage will migrate to the shadow banking system if banks are regulated more tightly. As a result, only the Fed’s interest-rate instrument, Stein and Tarullo argue, can get into all of the financial system’s cracks.

But if the Fed has only one effective instrument – interest rates – its two goals of economic and financial stability cannot be pursued simultaneously.

Ø  Either the Fed pursues the first goal by keeping rates low for longer and normalizing them very slowly, in which case a huge credit and asset bubble would emerge in due course;

Ø  Or the Fed focuses on preventing financial instability and increases the policy rate much faster than weak growth and high unemployment would otherwise warrant, thereby halting an already-sluggish recovery.

The exit from the Fed’s QE and zero-interest-rate policies will be treacherous: Exiting too fast will crash the real economy, while exiting too slowly will first create a huge bubble and then crash the financial system.

Bubble

If the exit cannot be navigated successfully,
a dovish Fed is more likely to blow bubbles.